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Abstract
Certain threats, such as terrorism tend to have a low probability of affecting us directly, yet reminders of them 
(such as media news) are striking. Could individuals with particular personality traits find them distractive from 
the usual priorities in daily decision-making? This study explored the putative effects of media-driven terrorism 
threat, on two economic preferences (risk aversion and delay discounting) - using a sample reasonably closely 
representative of a modern Western city. Participants (N = 78) higher on impulsivity showed lower risk-seeking 
under terrorism threat. Discussed are directions for further research and the implications for media coverage of 
terrorist threat.
[Note: All supplementary materials referenced in this article may be downloaded from https://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/jtr/8_2/1305-3805-1-SP.pdf ]
Introduction
Terrorism has become a prominent feature of the modern world. While governments focus on preventing 
attacks and improving physical security, some researchers and policy-makers are concerned with the 
psychological ‘ripple’ effects on the public, suggesting that fear/anxiety, itself, may carry a cost and, as 
such, should be a major concern for governments (Sunstein, 2003). For many people, terrorism may be 
conceptualised as a dread risk which entails a high degree of uncertainty regarding the probability of threat, 
its time/location and mechanism of attack (Slovic, 2002) – where it is especially difficult to exercise personal 
control. These features of terrorism are made worse by the realisation that terrorists target places considered 
to be ‘safe’ and of everyday use.
Terrorism-related behaviour changes have been observed with regards to multiple risk-taking, impulsive 
behaviours and coping behaviours (see review by Ben-Zur & Zeidner, 2009; for specific link of dread risk to 
car accidents, see Gigerenzer, 2006). Many of these changes were demonstrated to be affected, or even driven, 
by exposure to media (Ben-Zur, Gil, & Shamshins, 2012). Individual differences in these effects have also 
been observed (Maguen, Papa, & Litz, 2008). Although the literature is rich and varied, there is no consensus 
as to how far the threat reaches and the direction of effects on behaviour. Ben-Zur and Zeidner (2009) 
highlighted the tension between studies reporting an increase, on the one hand, in risky driving, substance 
abuse and raised consumption and, on the other hand, the substantial set of opposite or null effects – this 
may be due to the post-hoc nature of self-reported behaviours and conflation with extraneous variables, or, 
even, variation in the individual differences of participants in the different samples.
Controlled experimental studies offer insight into the ability of terrorism threat to evoke thoughts of one’s 
own mortality (Mortality Salience, MS) within the Terror Management Theory (TMT) framework (Solomon, 
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Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). TMT states that we cope with the inevitability of death by celebrating life 
and affirming one’s existence in the present. Consequently, thoughts of one’s own death have been linked to 
such ‘carpe diem’ outcomes in economic decision-making as heightened risk-taking, reduced self-regulation, 
conspicuous consumption, and present-bias (reviewed in Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Several studies 
in the TMT field have used specifically terrorism-based stimuli in experiments, but conclusions on risk-
taking and impulsive behaviours have, once again, been mixed. At the same time, an emerging literature on 
Uncertainty Management looks at changes in behaviour caused by uncertainty about how to behave and what 
to expect from the world (Van den Bos et al., 2005). Existing studies show that, in the domain of cultural 
beliefs, uncertainty has a different effect to mortality (Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009). Exploring whether a 
similar uncertainty component within the threat of terrorism would affect economic preferences appears 
important.
Individual differences under existential threat do not have an established link to economic preferences in 
the literature; however, there are reasons for believing such links may exist. Low socioeconomic status in 
childhood has been linked to higher risk-seeking and delay-impatience under salience of treacherous and 
life-threatening environments (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011). Self-esteem and locus of 
control over events in one’s life has been shown to predict higher risk seeking (Burke et al., 2010). The lack of 
consensus in this literature points to the need for more studies to examine the relevance of personality traits 
in much more detail.
Although the specific links between personality and economic preferences have yet to be established 
(Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz, 2011), there are some findings of relevance. Zuckerman and 
Kuhlman (2000) linked lower levels of impulsive sensation-seeking to lower risk-taking, appraisal of 
environment as being more threatening, and higher harm-avoidance. However, since most of the past 
studies have relied on the five-factor personality model, which includes impulsiveness as a subscale of 
neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992), it has proved difficult to disentangle the specific effects of impulsivity 
from those of neuroticism and harm-avoidance, which themselves have been shown to be associated with 
risk-averse decisions (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005; Lauriola & Levin, 2001). On a 
neuropsychological level, risk-taking tasks activate the insula, which is, in turn, linked to harm-avoidance 
and neuroticism (Paulus et al., 2003). Uncertainty, in turn, had been shown to provoke heightened neural 
response in same insula brain areas linked to harm-avoidance (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008). In cancer patients, 
uncertainty about threat to life has been shown to manifest in present-focused consumption of ‘possessions 
and experiences’ (Pavia & Mason, 2004).
The above leads us to suggest that certain dimensions of personality should respond to the uncertainty 
component of terrorism threat leading to more present-focused and harm-avoidant choices. We feel there is 
a need to test how individual variation in decision-making in reaction to terror-related and mortality-related 
stimuli relate to variation in major systems of approach and avoidance. To examine this issue, we adopted 
the theoretical framework afforded by the reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) of personality (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004; summarised in Corr, 2013) which provides measures of 
fundamental traits based on neurobehavioral systems underlying emotion and motivation. As detailed by 
Corr and Cooper (2016), RST contains three major systems: one positive, the Behavioural Approach System 
(BAS, related to approach motivation and the emotions of hopeful anticipation and reward reactivity); and 
two negative, the Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS, related to avoidance/escape and the emotion of fear) and 
the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS, related to the detection of goal-conflict and the emotion of anxiety).
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The advantage of using the RST personality scale is that it distinguishes between behaviour-inhibiting (BIS-
related) anxiety and behaviour-expressive (BAS-related) impulsivity, as it also allows separation of (FFFS-
related) fear. We thus do not have a conflation of these separate factors with general neuroticism.
We made the following predictions.
1. We expected that individuals high on both impulsivity and anxiety would react most to the 
uncertainty component of terrorism, as assessed by behaviour reflecting greater harm-avoidance 
and present-focus – this would translate into choices of lower risks and more immediate rewards. 
However, recognizing that BIS-anxiety reflects not only reaction to a threat, but also behavioural 
inhibition until a goal-conflict is resolved, we anticipated that its effect may be less clear-cut than the 
one for impulsivity.
2. For mortality salience, which is associated with much higher certainty (we will all die eventually) and, 
therefore, more of a ‘carpe diem’ reminder to transcend death by celebrating life here and now, we 
expected high impulsivity and anxiety either not to dominate decision-making, or to lead to greater 
higher risk-taking and, likely, higher preference for immediate rewards.
3. To have a way of distinguishing effects on delay-impatience, we also suggested that individuals low 
on the Goal-Drive Persistence factor of BAS personality (responsible for focus on achievement of 
one’s goals, and opposite to impulsive actions) would respond to the ‘carpe diem’ effect of mortality 
salience, increasing delay-impatience, but we predicted it would not change preferences under 
terrorism.
Most of the studies discussed above focused on people who experienced a proximate exposure to terrorism 
(Israeli citizens, New York citizens after 9/11, Turkey citizens). In contrast, we aimed to test a wider effect of 
terrorism, focusing on people exposed to it through news stories.
Method[1]
Participants
Data collection took place over August 2015. Participants (N = 108) were recruited online to participate 
in the study which was described as an investigation of media and economic preferences. Fully completed 
surveys were entered in a raffle for €20 Amazon voucher. Some attempts (n = 22) were interrupted by a 
software issue. For the remaining 86 participants[2], mean age was 31 years (SD = 7.7); 54 were UK residents, 
16 EU residents, 12 resided in the rest of the world, 4 preferred not to declare.
The sample represented reasonably well the population of a modern Western city on dimensions of income, 
employment, religion, and sexual orientation – as compared to the demographics for London, Paris, New 
York or Berlin. There were 24 students, 46 full-time employed, 3 unemployed, 1 retired, 10 part-time 
employed, 2 non-declared; 39 were male, 41 female, 6 non-declared. Mean annual combined household 
income was £46,000. There were 52 participants who declared no religion; for the reminder: Christianity 
= 19, Judaism = 2, other religions = 2, preferred not to say = 2. Sixty-three had heterosexual orientation, 5 
bisexual, 9 homosexual, and 1 did not say. We also checked that participants had not been directly exposed to 
terrorism (see results section).
Out of the 86 participants, four showed inconsistent preferences, for two participants, data on economic 
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preferences were missing, two did not complete the writing task, so their data were removed from the 
analysis. The remaining complete questionnaires for seventy-eight _participants (39 males, 35 females, 4 
preferred not to declare; mean age 32 years) were analysed.
Design
A between-subjects design was used.
Threat manipulation. Priming in the TMT protocol allows some flexibility (see review by Burke et al., 2010). 
Most popular prime involves asking participants to write down what they think happens when they die, and 
to jot down emotions aroused by thoughts of their own death. Some primes used death-related pictures; 
there have also been successful primes using terrorism-related stimuli (Echebarria Echabe & Perez, 2015). 
The goal of this study was to prime Terrorism as it is naturally encountered through the media; priming 
Mortality in the same format would enable comparisons between combination of MS and uncertainty in case 
of Terrorism.
Terrorism prime comprised extracts from a video: ‘Dozens Killed in Islamic Militant Attacks in 
Four Countries’ (2 min 50s; Bloomberg Business, 2015). The video emphasized high uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the threat, discussed whether the attacks were to increase in frequency, and whether 
danger might come from extremist citizens within western countries; it did not contain explicitly aversive 
images (see Supplementary Material 2.4 for script and screenshots). Mortality prime posed a challenge of 
finding an applicable TV-programme; our best option comprised extracts from the video: ‘How Much Is Your 
Dead Body Worth’ (2 min 33s; BBC Horizon, 2008). The control video was ‘The Truth About…Your Teeth’ (2 
min 0s; BBC One, 2015). Dental pain has been widely used as control prime and can produce routine levels 
of anxiety and fear, compared to existential threats (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). Following 
the Threat video, participant completed a task designed to reinforce the prime in the video.
Materials
RST-PQ. The 65 items Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory Personality Questionnaire (RST-PQ, Corr & 
Cooper, 2016), consisting of six factors, was used. The behavioural inhibition system (BIS, related to anxiety, 
responsible for worry, obsessive thoughts and behavioural inhibition) reflects the assessment of goal-conflict, 
which generates negative emotion and leads to ‘cautious approach’ (example item, I’m always weighing-up the 
risk of bad things happening in my life). Distinguishing between the four components of behavioural approach 
system (BAS) allows finer-grained differentiation of reactions to rewarding stimuli and resulting approach 
behaviour: BAS Impulsivity (e.g., I’m always buying things on impulse), BAS Goal-Drive Persistence (e.g., I 
am very persistent in achieving my goals). Items are answered on 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree). The RST-PQ contains two other BAS factors: Reward Interest (e.g., I regularly 
try new activities just to see if I enjoy them) and Reward Reactivity (e.g., I get a special thrill when I am praised 
for something I’ve done well).
Distraction task. According to the TMT literature, the distal, threat-unrelated effects of Mortality threat 
manifest more strongly after a distraction task, once the threat is out of immediate consciousness (Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). In compliance with the standard procedures of the field, a self-report mood 
scale PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and general questions supporting cover story were used.
Risk and Delay. This measure was a variation of a standard multiple options checklist widely used in 
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experimental literature (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2008). For risk, participants answered 
questions ‘What would you prefer to get?’ separately for each pair of options: a risky option of ‘50% chance 
of €800’ and a safe option (ranging over the 11 choices of €100 to €600). For delay, participants answered 
the same for each pair of options: a smaller-sooner amount of €100 “tomorrow” and a larger-later amount 
(ranging over the 7 choices from €110 to €170) after a delay of 90 days–this is detailed in Supplementary 
Material 2.4.
Procedure
The experiment was based on the Qualtrics Platform. Following an online signature of informed consent, 
participants completed the RST-PQ personality questionnaire, then were randomly allocated to one of the 
three Threat conditions. They then proceeded to the distraction task on mood and media preferences, and 
questions on target economic preferences. The flow of study activities is shown in Figure 1.
Results
Pearson product-moment correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Writing Task
We utilized the writing task with a second purpose of checking participants’ self-reported experience with 
terrorism and identify those who were directly affected.
All the participants under the terrorism treatment completed the writing task (mean length = 43 words). 
None of them mentioned direct experience of terrorism. We hoped to see a variety of opinions on terrorism, 
expected from a sample to be reasonably reflective of a modern Western city. The opinions ranged from 
radical “Can’t wait for a religion free society” to reflective “Complicated. Not black & white. Don’t trust 
agencies with agendas too much” to analytical “religious fundamentalism is a symptom, not a cause”, to 
detached “Won’t be going to Tunisia any time soon”, to emotional “I am scared for my family and friends 
being victims of an attack”.
Mood
We used the PANAS mood scale to compare emotional response to the treatments on the measures of 
General Positive Affect (GPA, 10 items) and General Negative Affect (GNA, 10 items).
There was no evidence of significant difference in GNA between Mortality and Dentistry, p > .10, which is 
common for the TMT literature (Lambert et al., 2014 review supporting studies and recent counterevidence). 
In Terrorism, however, GNA was significantly higher (20.48) compared to Dentistry (16.89), and to Mortality 
(16.11), p < .05. This suggests that Terrorism evoked proximal (threat-related) emotions, whereas Mortality 
did not.[3].
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Economic Preferences Measures
Risk-Seeking
To compare the overall effects of threat manipulation, a between-groups ANOVA was first run with Threat 
as fixed factor, and Sex, Age and negative Mood as covariates. Three orthogonal contrasts were constructed 
to assess whether either of two experimental conditions were different from the control condition, and 
whether the experimental conditions were different between each other. Specifically, we computed a contrast 
that coded the Terrorism condition as +1, the Mortality condition as 0, and the Dentistry condition as -1, 
testing whether the Terrorism salience manipulation yielded differential effects on risk-seeking than the 
control condition. The contrast showed significant differences in mean risk-seeking under Terrorism (4.87) 
and Dentistry (5.70), F(1, 78) = 5.46, p < .05. Mean risk-seeking in Terrorism was also significantly lower 
than in Mortality (5.58), F(1, 78) = 9.81, p < .001 . The same procedure comparing Mortality to control 
(Terrorism coded as 0, Mortality as +1, Dentistry as -1) showed no significant difference in means, p > .10. 
This supported our prediction regarding the effects of Terrorism on risk-seeking, but made us weary about 
the strength of Mortality manipulation.
The prediction about effect of high/low levels of (BAS-related) Impulsivity and (BIS-related) Anxiety on risk 
preference under threat was tested using the following model.
Risk-seekingscale = a+b 0 MoodGNA + b1 ThreatTerr + b2 ThreatMort + b3 ThreatMort x MoodGNA + b4 ThreatTerr 
x MoodGNA + b5 PersonalityBAS-Imp + b6 PersonalityBIS-Anx + b7 ThreatTerr x PersonalityBAS-Imp + b8 ThreatTerr x 
PersonalityBIS-Anx + b9 ThreatMort x PresonalityBAS-Imp + b10 ThreatMort x PersonalityBIS-Anx + Covariates
A multivariate ANOVA/GLM was used, with threat as a single fixed factor, and negative Mood, BAS-Imp 
and BIS-Anxiety as continuous predictor variables. Two-way interactions between Threat and Personality 
variables, and between Threat and negative Mood, revealed a significant interaction: Threat x BAS-Imp, F(2, 
66) = 8.85, p < .001. A plot of mean Risk-Seeking against Low and High (median-split) BAS-Imp for the three 
Threat groups in Figure 3 makes it easy to observe that there was no difference under Dentistry; but under 
Terrorism, individuals high on the BAS-Imp factor showed lower risk-seeking; under Mortality individuals, 
those high on the BAS-Imp factor tended to show higher risk-seeking.
Formally, the GLM revealed a significant interaction of Terrorism x BAS-Imp, indicating that the effect of 
BAS-Imp on risk-seeking in Terrorism was significantly lower from that in Dentistry, β(diff) = 1.65, p < 
.01; however, the evidence only indicated a trending difference in the effect of BAS-Imp on risk-seeking 
in Mortality, as compared to Dentistry, p = .16. The effect of BAS-Imp in Terrorism was also significantly 
different from that in Mortality, β(diff) = 2.78, p < .01. Following Aiken and West (1991) procedure for 
decomposing an interaction, the estimated coefficients indicated a significant negative relationship between 
BAS-Imp and risk-seeking in Terrorism, β = -0.59, h2 = .11, p < .01, a significant positive relationship in 
Mortality, β = 0.64, h2 = .12, p < .01, but no evidence for an effect in Dentistry, p > .01. These results suggest 
that individuals higher on impulsivity were less risk-seeking under terrorism, which supports our hypothesis. 
Under mortality prime, individuals higher on impulsivity preferred gambles with higher risk – which is also 
in line with our hypothesis. This effect, however, was statistically indistinguishable from that in Dentistry 
condition which requires caution in interpretation.
The model also showed a significant interaction Threat x BIS-anxiety, F(2, 66) = 3.39, p < .05, which 
suggested that the effect in Terrorism was significantly different from that in Mortality, β(diff) = 1.71, p = .02; 
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there was no evidence of the effect in Terrorism being different from that in Dentistry, p > .10. These results 
do not support our hypotheses.
Delay
An ANOVA with Threat as fixed factor, and Sex, Age and negative Mood as covariates, with three orthogonal 
contrasts to assess overall effect of experimental conditions, showed no difference in mean delay-impatience 
in three threat groups, p > .10. This was anticipated, since in past literature effects were found only when 
individual differences were considered. The prediction about effect of high/low levels of Impulsivity, Anxiety 
and BAS-GDP on delay preference under threat was tested using the following model.
Delay-Impatiencescale = a+ b0 MoodGNA a+ b1 Threat + b2 ThreatMort + b3 ThreatMort x MoodGNA + b4 ThreatTerr x 
MoodGNA + b5 PresonalityBAS-Imp + b6 PersonalityBIS-Anx + b6 PersonalityBAS-GDP + b8 ThreatTerr x PersonalityBAS-
Imp + b9 ThreatTerr x PersonalityBIS-Anx + b10 ThreatTerr x PersonalityBAS-GDP + b11 ThreatMort x PersonalityBAS-Imp + 
b12 ThreatMort x PersonalityBIS-Anx + b13 ThreatMort x PersonalityBAS-GDP + Covariates
A multivariate ANOVA/GLM was used, with threat as a single fixed factor, and negative Mood, BAS-Imp, 
BIS-Anxiety, and BAS-GDP as continuous predictor variables, with two-way interactions between Threat and 
Personality variables, and between Threat and negative Mood. The model revealed a significant interaction: 
Mortality x BAS-GDP, F(2, 63) = 4.45, p < .05. A plot of mean Delay-Impatience against Low and High 
(median-split) BAS-GDP for the three Threat groups in Figure 4 shows that under Dentistry individuals high 
on BAS-GDP were more impatient about financial gains than those low; under Terrorism high BAS-GDP 
individuals tended towards higher impatience; under Mortality, on the contrary, they tended towards lower 
impatience.
Formally, the effect of BAS-GDP on delay-impatience in Mortality was significantly lower than that in 
Dentistry, β(diff) = 1.31, p < .05; however, the data did not indicate difference in the effect of BAS-GDP 
on delay-impatience in Terrorism when compared to Dentistry, p > .10. The effect of BAS-GDP on delay-
impatience in Mortality was also significantly different from that in Terrorism, β(diff) = 1.64, p < .01. 
Following Aiken and West (1991), the estimated coefficients indicated a significant negative effect of BAS-
GDP on delay-impatience in Mortality, β = -0.36, h2 = .06, p < .05, a trending positive effect in Terrorism, β = 
0.40, h2 = .05, p < .10, but no effect in Dentistry, p > .10[4]. This evidence supported the hypothesis that lower 
goal drive-persistence would heighten delay-impatience under Mortality. The data also suggested possibility 
of an opposite effect of BAS-GDP in Terrorism, which was not anticipated in the hypotheses.
The model also revealed a significant interaction Terrorism x BIS-anxiety, indicating that the effect of BIS-
anxiety on delay-impatience in Terrorism was significantly higher than that in Dentistry, β(diff) = 1.28, p < 
.05; there was a trending difference in the effect of BIS-anxiety on delay-impatience in Mortality as compared 
to Dentistry, p < .10. The effect of BIS-anxiety on delay-impatience in Terrorism was also significantly 
different from that in Mortality, β(diff) = 1.68, p < .01[5]. These results suggest that individuals higher on 
anxiety were generally less impatient about delayed rewards, and there was a change in this preference under 
threat – which is an interesting evidence, but we do not consider it strong enough to support our hypotheses. 
There were no effects of BAS-Imp on delay-impatience in the data. The model with full set of covariates also 
revealed an overall negative effect of BAS-RI on delay-impatience, β = -0.34, h2 = .12, p = .01.
There was clear evidence of participants higher on Impulsivity becoming less risk-seeking under Terrorism 
(displayed in Figure 3.B) and for participants lower on BAS-GDP becoming more delay-impatient under 
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Mortality (displayed in Figure 4.B). The effects of BIS-anxiety were less pronounced and mixed.
Comparing with past literature, Griskevicius et al. (2011) found similar size effects on risk-seeking under 
stimuli of life-threatening and treacherous future: when moderating role of socio-economic status at 
childhood (SES) was considered; the effects similarly divided into lower risk-seeking for higher SES (h2 = .10) 
and higher risk-seeking for lower SES (h2 = .14). The effects delay-impatience choices were similarly smaller 
(h2 = .08, h2 = .12), some of them of marginal significance. Yavuz and Van den Bos (2009) reported larger 
effects of mortality (h2 = .20) and uncertainty (h2 = .46) on the negative reaction towards an essay violating 
the cultural worldviews, which suggests that effects in the domain of economic preferences may be smaller 
than in domain of emotional judgments and cultural beliefs.
General Discussion
If you take a group of people who are similarly aware of the existence of terrorism threat in their life, and 
expose them to a media reminder of it, would this lead to change in their decision-making? If this is found 
then are there personality differences which predict these psychological reactions? Our study set out to 
answer these questions. Our results show that for impulsive individuals, exposure to media reminders of 
terrorism systematically increase their aversion to financial risk — compared to being exposed to routine 
life nuisances such as dental procedures. Becoming more conservative in risk-taking decisions can have 
strong effects on one’s life; for instance, this could translate into missed life opportunities (e.g., changing 
jobs, pursuing new projects, and starting a family) when contact with the media (including social type) is 
extensive. Therefore, impulsivity influences not just attitude towards risk, but also behaviour.
To what extent it is rational to adjust decision-making in view of terrorism as a low probability but, 
potentially, high-impact, threat is still a matter of debate. The modern world, however, can be particularly 
anxiety provoking – great technical progress in the development of media also means that individuals with a 
pessimistic outlook on the world can ‘feed’ this worldview by selectively accessing negative news from around 
the world. The tendency of social media to show users ‘more of a like’ can create skewed impressions of the 
world. It is important that individuals are aware of susceptibility of their personality to such effects and do 
not let such effects prevent them from pursuing their goals and making well-weighted decisions.
In terms of limitations of our research, future work with larger sample sizes are needed to replicate and 
extend our findings. In addition, we measured only the immediate effect on economic preferences, so we 
cannot say anything about longer terms effects.
Conclusion
Understanding the mechanisms through which anxiety caused by news of terrorist attacks can affect 
economic preferences in daily life through perceived threat and uncertainty can help us not allow such news 
to distract us from important goals in our life — informing more objective decision-making on individual 
level, and relevant policy-making on country level. The way individuals perceive terrorism threat can result 
in changes of risk-taking and delay-discounting choices, and basic approach-avoidance personality factors 
shows that some people may be especially vulnerable to these effects. It is important to understand and 
anticipate citizens’ reactions to terrorism as a threat to their usual way of life to mitigate negative impact. 
It is to be hoped that the findings we report serve to shed light on the important impact on key economic 
variables as well as the influence of personality factors in shaping these psychological reactions.
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